In 2010, five years before the events in Paris, nothing seemed to indicate that something big was about to happen. After his release from prison, former Al Qaeda recruiter Djamel Beghal was now living under house arrest, in a godforsaken place in the mountains of Southern France. But he was keeping in touch with his network of friends and associates, both old and new ones, and he was planning for a major operation.
Three generations of radicals
His idea was to organize the prison break of a historic figure of radical islam, imprisoned in northern France for his role in a bombing campaign in 1995 that left 8 people dead and 200 injured. Beghal has gathered a genuine „commando unit“ of radicals who were willing to storm the penitentiary, escape and then prepare again for a major terror campaign in France.
But French intelligence was onto him and Beghal, as well as several co-conspirators were arrested and indicted. What the ensuing trial showed was the multi-faceted shape radical Islam had taken in France, and in Europe for that matter. Three generations of jihadis had been arrested:
– „old timers“ like French-Algerian Ahmed-Laidouni, a veteran of the civil war in Bosnia and former member of the „El-Mudzahid“ brigade. Laidouni had also spent time in Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Also there was Farid Melouk, another radical from the days of the Afghan and Algerian Jihad and a member of the the cell that had perpetrated the bombings of 1995;
– generation „post 9/11“, like Sherif Kouachi in particular and some of his buddies from the „Buttes-Chaumont“ network, that had funnelled fighters into Iraq between 2003 and 2005, and finally
– „newbies“ of Jihad, i.e. ex-gangsters, drug dealers and bank robbers who had been radicalised in prison. Amedy Coulibaly, the Paris hostage taker, was among them of course, but also a number of other new converts.
Charges were pressed, people went to jail – again – and whatever the plan for the „Big one“ was (possibly a large scale cyanide poison attack), it had to be put on the back burner. Not everybody was convicted though. Sherif Kouachi in particular saw his charges dropped, for lack of evidence. Salim Benghalem, the „most wanted“ ISIS terrorist, was also spared and soon vanished into thin air, out of reach for French intelligence.
The Al Qaeda in Yemen connection
Around the same time, in 2011, the other Kouachi brother, Saïd, finally showed his true colours. According to information US intelligence shared with their French counterparts in November 2011, Saïd Kouachi had stayed in Yemen in July and August of that year. Details about his exact whereabouts during his stay are still sketchy, but is is established he got in touch with local Salafi radicals, and might have been trained in one the AQAP’s camps in the country.
Regarding the younger of the two brothers, a possible security lapse in his monitoring by French authorities might have given him a chance to go to Yemen as well, for a period of two weeks in July 2011, approximately at the same time as his brother. French intelligence is still investigating the incident, but if this is confirmed, Sherif Kouachi was probably telling the truth when he said that he had been to Yemen and had trained there for a short time, possibly even meeting US born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. However, until further corroborating evidence is provided, we will disregard this for the time being. In any case, it would only tend to reinforce the AQAP connection of the two brothers.
The 2011 stay in the South of the Arabian peninsula may seem rather astounding to the untrained eye, especially at a time when Kouachi might easily have gone to Pakistan or Iraq. However, his choice to go to Yemen was probably a very calculated one. By 2011, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula had mutated into an efficient fighting force, strong enough to carve out a piece of Yemen for its own purposes. AQAP was also at the forefront of Jihadi technological and combat innovation.
Much is being said about Anwar al-Awlaki and the possibility he might have met both Kouachi brothers during their stay around the city of Shihr, or in the Marib area. But from an operational point of view, AQAP’s effectiveness is more the work of an ex-bodyguard of Osama Bin Laden, who has been at the forefront of military (and terrorist) thinking within the organisation: Yusuf al-Ayeri is the man who put AQAP „on the map“. He was killed in 2003, but his expertise has been taken on board by those who carried on fighting in Yemen. For potential foreign radicals like Saïd Kouachi, AQAP would have been the most attractive and promising of the AQ franchises that existed at the time. AQAP’s operational technics and teachings were beyond anything the other groups had to offer, especially with regard to planning attacks, bombing preselected targets, or producing and using poison – like cyanide.
The other aspect that is worth mentioning about AQAP in relation to the Kouachi brothers, is that this is of course the franchise that created Al Qaeda’s online magazine „Inspire“, in which the chief-editor of „Charlie Hebdo“ is mentioned on a „most wanted list“ … dead or alive. AQAP has now taken officially credit for the operation of the Kouachi brothers against „Charlie Hebdo“, although this can’t be taken at face value yet. It may very well be be that a video testament of both brothers will be sent out through official AQAP channels in a couple of months, which would at that point confirm what is now only one possible scenario, even though it is backed by strong circumstantial evidence.
Whatever the answer to these questions, Saïd Kouachi never returned to Yemen after 2011. The last piece of evidence that is likely to tie him and his brother to the AQAP leadership is an Internet connection between a senior member of AQAP and an unknown Internet user in a cybercafé located just down the road of the Kouachi brothers‘ flat in Paris, in October 2011.
Staying under the radar
French intelligence had now enough to resume serious surveillance on both brothers. For months, their phone conversations and online activities were monitored and 24/7 physical surveillance took place for a while, but to no avail. The Kouachis had learnt their lessons. They were now experienced enough to know what would trigger more police scrutiny and did their best to appear as harmless as possible. Both of them had gotten married and had regular jobs, going as far as distancing themselves from their radical past in regular sit-downs with French intelligence.
During the three years prior to the deadly Paris attacks, none of what they did seemed to call for closer surveillance. The French finally dropped the ball, hamstrung that they were also by strict privacy laws. Resources were scarce and the French counter-terrorism agency was stretched thin already, having to deal more and more with would be jihadis or returnees from Syria.
By the time their old buddy, Amedy Coulibaly, was released from prison once again, in March 2014, there was no tangible proof or evidence linking the Kouachi brothers to any wrongdoing. They had finally managed to disappear almost totally from the radar of the French police. And there were good – and not so good – reasons that could explain or justify downgrading them as potential threats.
The intelligence lapse
The real blunder however, the one that is going to send shockwaves through the French counter-terrorist system is the way they handled Coulibaly. The former bank robber, turned drug dealer, turned jihadi, would remain a unknown quantity from the time he got released in March 2014 to the day he ambushed two police officers in Paris, on January 8th 2015.
That’s a gap of almost 9 months, during which nothing of what he was up to is known. Coulibaly and his wife Hayat Boumediene, the mystery woman who left for Turkey a few days before the Paris attacks, had probably all the time and freedom of movement they needed to recruit a couple of „little hands“ and prepare for what the group had in mind. It seems now more and more likely that these preparations were coordinated with the Kouachi brothers. Hayat Boumediene’s mobile phone, for example, was used to make over 500 calls with Sherif Kouachi’s wife in 2014, and in hindsight, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out the people speaking to each were not the two wifes.
Regarding finance and logistics, evidence has also surfaced showing that Coulibaly managed to get a small bank loan approved (worth about 10 000 US dollars) without triggering any background check. That he used this money to help finance the operation and at least buy some of the weapons used in the attack is a definite possibility. Other financial resources must have been used as well though, possibly funds that AQAP provided the brothers with, in 2011, but also money from small time illegal activities the younger Kouachi brother was engaging in.
According to official estimates, the military-grade arsenal that was found both on the attackers and in their homes was worth around 20 000 US dollars. Most of it was bought in Belgium, in Brussels or possibly Antwerp, which have strong connections to Balkan organized crime: the „M82“ Zolja RPG that was found on Sherif Kouachi’s body was a model used only in ex-Yugoslavia. The Tokarev handguns and Skorpion VZ61 submachine gun (also license-built in Yugoslavia) point in the same direction.
A closer look at the „Charlie Hebdo“ attack
The MO of the attacks, especially the apparent lack of an efficient exit strategy, as well as some minor mistakes that could however have had serious consequences on the „success“ of the operation has now some observers guessing as to the level of preparation of the attacks. It would however be seriously misguided to consider the attack on „Charlie Hebdo“ as the opportunistic act of a couple of brain damaged amateurs. Obviously, neither the Kouachi brothers nor Coulibaly were „professional“ hitmen. Their weapon handling skills left much to be desired, contrary to the hyped-up tune that has been coming from some TV channels and other news outlets.
But they had managed to either go totally off the grid, or never even appear on it. The attack on „Charlie Hebdo“ required at least a basic level of research and surveillance, for a considerable amount of time, and was probably carried out by people other than the Kouachi brothers, who first managed to enter into the wrong building on the day of the attack, and then got to the wrong floor. But it is standard procedure in the AQ handbook never to send in the „assault“ group for a recon, not even a last-minute walk through the target area. The danger of the „eye in the sky“ and other CCTV and electronic surveillance is considered too great a risk. As for the lack of a decent exit strategy, this can be traced back directly to tactics taught by AQAP and other AQ franchises: preparing the way in, but not the way out, as these attacks are considered „martyr“ operations and the attackers either improvise their getting away or get killed in a shoot-out with security forces. Such tactics also have an advantage in terms of further diminishing exposure to potential detection during the planning phase of the attack.
By the time Coulibaly sprang into action, the next day, the die was cast. Time and 80 000 police and paramilitary forces were against the group. They would try and last as long as possible, which turned out to be exactly 53 hours after the first attack. In the end, 17 innocent people would have died, in addition to the three terrorists, and a lot of questions needed answers.